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Gerald Korngold*

Sanborn v. McLean: A Strange

Tale of Inquiry Notice and
Implied Burdens
Life in American cities at the turn of the 20th century was a ti1rn~ of'
growth, eneq.,,y, turbulence, and transformation. Industrialization of the
Northern cities, a trend begun in the 19th century, continued relentlessly. The economic growth that had propelled the United States from a
rural backwater in 1800 to the leading industrial power in 1900 continued, and American firms began to take a leadership role in the world
economy. Thousands of immigrants from across the oceans and from the
rural areas of the United States crowded into noisy, bustling cities
seeking employment in the new factories and chasing their piece of the
American dream. Noise, pollution, traffic, disease, and social dislocation
grew exponentially in this environment.
People with resources sought housing arrangements that would
serve as a refuge from the increasingly hectic commercial and industrial
world. They wished for quiet residential arnas, with nice homes and tree
lined streets, free from the intrusions of" business establishments. These
owners often believed that these idyllic settings would lead to a helter
life and reinforce moral values for their families, and they sought to raise
their families in an area with similarly-minded people.
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, covenants recorded
against land were the chief vehicle to achieve residential districts with
building requirements and use restrictions. Whether enforced by injunction as "equitable servitudes" or for money damages as "real covenants," covenants could bind not only current hut also future owners to
the restrictive scheme, thus preserving the residential arrangement for
:, l'rofr•ssor of' Law, New York Law Sd10ol; Visiting l<',•llow. Lincoln I nsLit.ulP ol' Land
Policy. Camb1·iclgc, Massachus<'t.ls.
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an unlimited period of time. These doctrines were necessary since the
concepts of contract law did not allow for enforcement of promises
against subsequent owners of the burdened land who never expressly
agreed to be bound by subsequent owners of the benefited land who were
never expressly given the promise benefit. The changes in the law that
later made public land use regulation, such as zoning, a means to shape
neighborhoods had not yet occurred-that would not happen until the
1920s and the 19:30s. Covenants and servitudes thus offered landowners
in the first part of the twentieth century the only available means to
protect their neighborhoods from commercial or industrial intrusion.
To be binding, a covenant must be valid under the requirements of
covenants law. But there is a key second requirement: to be bound by a
covenant (or any other property interest) previously established against
a piece of property, future purchasers of the burdened land must have
notice of the restrictions the covenants imposed before they commit to
buying the land. Notice allows them to decide whether they actually
want to buy land that is limited to residential uses and, if so, to tailor
their negotiating position by offering a lower price to reflect the loss of
unfettered use of the land. The law is clear: if a purchaser of a lot does
not have notice of covenants burdening the land's use, the purchaser is
not hound.
The leading case of Sanborn u. McLean I arose in this context of late
19th century urban development, private a1c,rreements to create residential oases, and the importance of notice to constrain free use of property.
Sanborn includes multiple stories, some official, some not. There is, of
courne, the narrative of the case and its decision as set out for us by the
Supreme Court of' Michigan. I will relate that story but also tell you why
that narrative seems to have big gaps in it, both in terms of the factual
background that the court chose to recite and the legal reasoning that
the court applied. On the two legal issues the court faced-whether the
land was bound by a residential restriction and whether the subsequent
purchaser had notice of the restriction-the court made illogical, unprecedented, and (at least on the notice issue) wrong decisions.
That will lead us to other possible narratives within Sanborn u.
McLean which I f'eel go a long way to explain how the case was decided
and why the court's official story seems so wrong. The first seems to be a
tale of zoning by judicial fiat, without the benefit of legislative process
and guidelines or constitutional protections. The second appears to be a
1 2:l:\ Mich. 227. 20(i N.W. -19(i 1192:il. Sanhorn has hPc;n citc·d by nunwrous courts.
SP<\ ,•.g., lfoach v. WPsl Indies Inv. Co., f)4 F. Supp.2d (1:34, (i:37 ID.VJ. 2000); Clan9 v.
l{PckPr, ,tG:i l'a. -1:i2. 4:i'1, :l
J\.2d 898, 900 I 1974); Shipyard Property Owners' Ass'n v.
Mangiaracina. :m7 S.C. 299. :)ml, -114 S.K2d 7%, 802 !App.); Bowers Welding & Hotshot,
Inc v. Broml,•y, (if)() 1'.2d 299, :HJ4 1Wyo. 198:i).
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story of professional courtesy or sycophancy, where precedent and !'acts
may have been sacrificed to favor a powerful person.

The Story told by the Michigan Supreme Court
The Supreme Court or Michigan issued its opinion in Sanborn v.
McLean in December of 1925. The court's story began in 1891 in Detroit
with Robert and Joseph McLaughlin subdividing land that they owned
into building lots, creating the Green Lawn Subdivision. The court
discussed only the 91 lots of Green Lawn that [i·onkd on Collingwood
Avenue between Hamilton Boulevard to the west and Woodward Avenue
to the east, although reference to the McLaughlin's recorded plat shows
that the subdivision contained a similar number of lots on a street
(Lawrence Avenue) parallel to Collin1--,rwood. 2 Fifty-three of the 91 lots i!'l
the subdivision had express covenants in their deeds limiting the lots to
residential uses. The case, however, only describes 21 conveyances by the
McLaughlins with express restrictions, with it unclear who ec3tablished
the express restrictions on the other lots.
The court described Collin1,,rwood Avenue at the time of the case as
"a high grade residence street between Woodward avenue and Hamilton
boulevard, with single, double, and apartment houses.": 1 The houses
fronted on Collin1--,rwood, and an alley ran behind them, emptying into
side streets. John A. McLean purchased the west ;35 feet of lot 86 "in
1910 or 1911." He bought the property not f'rom the McLaughlins
directly but from owners who had bought the property after the
McLaughlins had conveyed it. 1 Neither the original deed that tht>
McLaughlins gave for lot 86 nor the subsequent deeds for that lot,
including the one to McLean, contained any residential restrictive covenants.0 At the time of purchase, there was a partly completed house on
2

hltp:,,/www.cis.slale.rni.us,, platmaps/dt_imagt'.asp?BC('._Sl I 1-ll N IJEX = 100G:l.

:1

20G N .W.2d al 49G.

1 Id. at 4\J7. Thl' stipulatl'd facts in llw l{l'rnrd indicall' that tlw det•d lo tlw prnp<'1t,,
was isslll'd to ,John McLl'an Ialong with his wif,,J only in IH18, hy Sarah A. (;n'llS<'l. ]{l'rnrd
lkfore the Suprenw Cou1·t or the Stall' or Michigan, No. :l2,0D4 illw "'l{l'rnrd"I. at /42. Th,,
1910 or 1911 datt, lik,,ly n·li.'rs lo llw clat,, in which McLt•an L'XPrnlPd a rnnlract or salt> lo
purchasl' Uw propt•rly. St>t' Tl'sl imony or lvkLt•an, l{l'rnrcl, al I 17, wlwn· Md,t•an lt>slilit>cl
that ht> bought the properly ·'about f'ourlt'l'n y<'ars" lll'forl' thl' 192,1 litigation and that
during the "first ypar llwl paid Wall.Pr(;. Set•ly on tlw contrnd, latPr on tlH' rnnlrad was
lrn11sfl•1Ted lo Sarnh. /\. (;n,u,wl." St•ely received tlw prop,•rly in llen•mlwr 1910. and
convey,·d it lo Cn•usel in 191:l. In 1\)21 ,John McLean quitclainwcl his inlt>rnsl in tlw
property to his wift, Christina. lkcord. at 41-42. Importantly, it is tlw tinw or tlw signing
or the contract or sak when tlw huyt>r acquin•s his int<'rt'sl in tlw propt•rty for tht' pu1-post'
or notice, even though the eked follows at a latt,r datt>.

,; Neither the contract nor the May 1, 1892 deed to lht> original purchaser or lot 86,
Clark A. Serviss, conlai1wd any n·striction. Ihil'f. for Dt•fondants and Appc>llants, Supn•nu,
Court or tlw State or Michigan. No. :12,mJ4, at 4, :14.
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the lot which McLean finished and occupied at the time of the litigation
with his wife, Christina McLean. The McLean property was located on
the northeast corner of Collingwood Avenue and Second Boulevard.
The case arose when the McLeans began building a gasoline filling
station on the back portion of their lot. Jessie Sanborn and other
homeowners on Collingwood brought an action against the McLeans and
their contractor before Judge George 0. Driscoll in Chancery division of
Wayne County Circuit Court, seeking to enjoin the construction. Judge
Driscoll held for the plaintiffs and ordered the McLeans to tear down the
work that already had been done. The McLeans appealed to the Supreme
Court. Plaintiffs maintained on appeal that the gas station would be a
nuisance per se, it would violate a "general plan fixed for use of all lots
on the street for residence purposes only," and that the McLeans' land
was subject to a "reciprocal negative easement" prohibiting the use as a
gas station. 1; The McLeans countered that no restriction appeared in
their chain of title, that they purchased without notice of any reciprocal
negative easement, and denied that there was a nuisance per se.
The Supreme Court did not address the issue of nuisance. Thus, the
first question for the court was whether defendants' land was bound by a
restrictive covenant that would prevent non-residential uses. The court
held that the land was indeed burdened by a reciprocal negative easement and upheld plaintiffs' judgment. The court declared that the 91
plats platted in 1891 were "designed for and each one sold solely for
residence purpose. " 7 How did this happen even though there were no
restrictions in defendants' chain of title (or in 38 of the 91 lots' chains of
title)? According to the court, through the doctrine of reciprocal negative
easements:
Ii If the owner of two or more lots, so situated as to bear the relation,
sells one with restrictions of benefit to the land retained, the
servitude becomes mutual, and, during the period of restraint, the
owner of the lot or lots retained can do nothing forbidden to the
owner of the lot sold.s
So, when the McLaughlins sold the first lots on Collinwood with
restrictions, the McLaughlins' retained lots 0ot 86 and all of the rest)
became impressed with the same restrictions as included in the first sold
lots at that point in time. It is that reciprocal negative easement that ran
with the land to the initial and subsequent purchasers of lot 86 (and the
other lots as welll. Following the logic of the court, there was no need to
re-create the restriction by placing it in the lot 86 deeds~it had already
1i

Id. at 496-497.

7

Id. at 497.

"Id.

>
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been created at the dawn of the subdivision based on the restrictions in
other lots that were conveyed by the subdividers.
The court made clear that reciprocal negative easements arise out of
the grantor's acts and intent in the initial stages of the development:
Such a scheme of restrictions must start with a common owner; it
cannot arise and fasten upon one lot by reason of other lot owners
conforming to a general plan. If a reciprocal negative easement
attached to defendants' lot, it was fastened thereto while in the
hands of the common owner of it and neighboring lots by way of sale
of other lots with restrictions beneficial at that time to it.!I
What was the evidence of the McLaughlins' intent to create an
implied reciprocal negative easement against the entire subdivision? The
only evidence cited by the court (or in the record) was that the 21 lots
sold prior to lot 86 contained residential restrictions, even though the
court also noted that after the sale of lot 86 some of the McLaughlins'
conveyances included express restrictions and others did not (remember
only 53 of 91 had a restriction). The court was unclear on how it
determined that the McLaughlins initially intended to create an implied
restriction scheme, leaving much to surmise and a retrospective view of
events to try to determine the grantors' original intent:
The original plan was repeatedly declared in subsequent sales of lots
by restrictions in the deeds, and, while some lots sold were not so
restricted, the purchasers thereof, in every instance, observed the
general plan and purpose of the restrictions in building residences.
For upward of 30 years the united efforts of all persons interested
have carried out the common purpose of making and keeping all the
lots strictly for residences, and defendants are the first to depart
therefrom. 111
Once the court found that lot 86 was subject to a restriction, it then
had to deal with the second issue: notice. The Michigan Supreme Court
recognized the traditional rule that a purchaser of an interest in real
property is only bound by prior interests and claims against the property
if' the purchaser had notice of the interest prior to buying. Bona fide
purchasers (i.e., takers without notice of prior rights) take free of the
prior interests. Thus, the McLeans would be bound by the reciprocal
negative easement only if John McLean had notice of it before he made
the agreement to purchase the land. Prevailing on this issue was
essential for plaintiffs~it would do them no good to win a covenant right
if they could not enforce it against a bona fide purchaser.
!I

Id.

10

Id.

,
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Notice can be "actual" or "constructive." "Actual" notice is what it
sounds like-the purchaser actually knows of the prior interest, as when
someone tells the purchaser of the earlier rights. There is no evidence of
actual notice in Sanborn. "Constructive" notice can be one of two
types-"rccord" notice or "inquiry" notice. A purchaser is deemed to
have record notice of any interest in a properly recorded instrument in
the chain of title of the property in question. Record notice was impossible in Sanborn since there was no express covenant right that could have
been recorded in the chain of title for lot 86.
That left inquiry notice for the Sanborn court. Inquiry notice works
as follows: the law presumes that every purchaser makes a reasonable
inspection of property before buying and then makes reasonable inquiry
about potential competing ownership claims that the physical inspection
revealed. 11 A classic example is that a potential buyer would inspect the
property, notice that someone other than seller is on the land, inquire of
that person, and learn that the person holds a (prior) ten year lease.
Failure to make the inspection and inquiry does not help the purchaser,
as the law attributes to her the information that she would have learned
whether or not she actually does what is required.
The court in Sanborn concluded that John McLean had inquiry
notice of the reciprocal negative casement binding lot 86. The court's
"logic" ran as follows as to what a reasonable "inspection" would have
revealed: there was a partially built dwelling on the lot when he
purchased; he had an abstract of title that told him that there had been
a common grantor and that there were 97 additional lots; 1i although he
was told by his seller that his lot was not restricted, 1'1 "Ihle could not
avoid noticing the strictly uniform residence character given the lots by
the expensive dwellings thereon.""
According to the court, from these facts, "the least inquiry would
have quickly developed the fact that lot 86 was subjected to a reciprocal
negative easement." 1;; What would such an inquiry have entailed? The
court explained that McLean did not have to ask his neighbors about a
11 Sec, e.g., Strace1wr v. Bailey, 7:l7 S.W.2d G:36,

s:rn l'l'Pnn. App. 19861.

ll I IPn, the eourt. eonternplat(•s a tot.al of' 98 lots fronting Collingwood, rat.h('r than 91
that it. used pn•viously. 98 is consistent. with t.lw recorded plat., see ht.t.p://www.cis.stat.c•.mi.
us/plat.maps/dLimage.asp?BCC_Sl/llINDEX= 1005:l ilast. visited .Jum• 28, 2008) and t.lw
Abstract of' TitlP in t.lw l{ecord. supra notp 4, at 202-:W:l.

1'1 It is unc!Par to llH' how being told that. the lot. was unrestricted helps to put onP on
inquiry of' a n,st.riction, yl'l t.lw court. c.:iU•s this fad. 206 N.W.2d at 498.
II

Id.

i;,

Id.
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restriction but "had he inquired he would have found of record the
reason for such general conformation. " 11;
Thus, the Supreme Court of Michigan decided for the plaintiffs on
the two key issues~first, they found that the defendants' lot was bound
by a restrictive covenant barring non-residential use such as the proposed gasoline station. Then the court held that the defendants had
inquiry notice of the restriction when they bought and thus were bound
by it. Ii

Why the Decision is a Troubling Departure
The Michigan Supreme Court illogically stretched precedent to f'ind
for the plaintiffs in Sanborn on both the existence of the restriction and
the determination of notice. The results are puzzling in light of existing
law and sound policy. The Sanborn court did not have to reach these
results, and certainly courts today should not repeat these errors. This
section will show that Sanborn stands on the outer edge of decisions on
reciprocal negative easements and inquiry notice, and I will offer an
alternative story that the Sanborn court should have told. In a subsequent section I will give my surmises as to why the Michigan Supreme
Court chose to tell the story that it did to render its flawed decision.

Reciprocal Negative Easement
"Reciprocal negative easements" are a subset of covenants running
with the land (known more specifically as equitable servitudes and real
covenants). 1·' Covenants law focuses on automatically moving the burdens and benefits of promises by current landowners to successor owners
of the parcels of the original covenanting parties. A typical case involves
two neighbors, A and B. A wants to ensure that B will not build a store
or factory on her property, so A pays B to expressly promise ( in a
recorded instrument) to restrict the use of her land to residences; the
law of covenants allows C, a successor owner of A's parcel, to bring an
action for an injunction or damages if D, the successor owner of B's land,
violates the covenant (such as by building a gas station on a lot
restricted to residential use).
11 ;

Id.

Ii Though Uw court uplwld thl' plaintif'f,-;' posit ion. it modif'i,•d t ht' 01·d,•1· 1·,•q11iring tlw
paitially built building to lw torn down by allowing t.h,· ch•f'l'ndants to rdain portions that
could !Jl' usl'd for rl'sid,·ntial purposl's.

IH OldPr courts ollPn usP tlw (t,rm "1wgat.ive casPmPnt." as s,vnonym,ius with "cm·,•n,u1t
running with t.lw land.'' Sl'<' (;,,raid Korngold. l'ri\'atl' Land lls,• Arrang,,111,•nts: 1,:asPmenls, Ikal Covunants and Equitable !-,prvit udes ~ 8.01, 290--291 12d ,,d. 20041.
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This is essentially what went on in Sanborn v. McLean with one
important difference-there was no express covenant binding lot 86!
None of the owners of lot 86-starting with the initial grantee from the
McLaughlins through the intermediate owners to John McLean--exprcssly a 6,-:reed to be bound by a restriction. No such covenant appears in
the chain of title-as we will see later, if it had been recorded before
McLean bought, we could presume or imply that he consented to be
bound. What is remarkable, therefore, about Sanborn is not the use of
the concept "reciprocal negative easement" but that the court implied
such a restriction against the McLeans' property. From the position of
the McLeans and prior owners of lot 86, the court created a covenant
where none had existed. 111
There are many excellent reasons to enforce express private land uHe
arrangements, such as covenants and easements (both collectively referred to in the parlance of the Third Restatement of Property-Servitudes as "servitudes). None, however, apply where there is no consent to
the covenant by the burdened owner.
Eff'icicncy. Enforcing freely-made agreements restricting the use of
land helps to achieve an efficient allocation of our limited land resources.
By allowing parties to buy and sell partial rights in land, such as
covenants, the purchaser is able to acquire only the rights that she
wants in the property. He does not have to overinvest and buy a fee
intereHt when a covenant is all that he needs and wants. So, continuing
with our earlier example, if the law of covenants did not validate the
purchaSl) of the restriction between A and B, A would have to buy a fee
interest in B's land in order to prevent commercial or industrial uses
next door. This would divert A's resources from other pursuits. Moreover, B is perfectly happy with continuing to own his property in fee,
subject to the residential covenant, but with the extra cash from Aeveryone gets what he or she wants.
The benefits of such efficiency-maximizing contracts will accrue not
only to A and B but also to successor owners C and D. Assuming that C
and D are aware of the covenant, they will adjust the price they are
willing to pay for their lots accordingly. C will pay A extra for the land to
reflect the value of the covenant, allowing A to recover his investment
and D will pay B less reflecting the burden of the restriction thus
preventing B from getting paid twice for the covenant right. To make an
efficiency justification work, however, it is essential that the original
parties consent to the terms of the deal. The consent of subsequent
111 lfrciprocal n,•gative Pas,,nwnt theory can be used in far less contrnversial settings.
For example, wlwn tlwre are ,·xpress rnvenants in all lots in a subdivision, the theory can
I)(' usPd to justif:v enforcenwnt hy prior purchasprs against latter purchasers. See Korngold,
supra not!' 17.
9.09. Sanhorn v. McLpan is a f'ar mon· difficult casp since t.lwrc was no
,•xpn•ss covpnant against lot 86 and so one had to be implied.

*
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owners to pre-existing covenants can be presumed only if they have
notice of the restriction before making their deal.
These efficiency benefits will result only from consensual transactions based on good inf'ormation--where the parties voluntarily exchange
promises and consideration in a /'rec market. If the law imposes additional, iwJwown obligations on the parties and re-arranges the deal, the
market will not operate efficiently. This is what the court did wrong in
Sanborn-it created a restriction that had never been agreed to and
imposed it on McLean who had no notice of it. McLean suffered most
immediately but the entire real estak transactions system is chilled hy
such decisions.

J,ibcrty. People can exercise tlwir freedom of' choice and control over
their own property by entering into consensual covlmant agreements.
Successor owners who buy with notice of these arrangements are
deemed to be making these choices as well. These expressions of' ownership rights should be respected except in rare instances where there are
strong overriding public policies.2' 1
When the law imposes a covenant on an owner who did not consent,
the owner's property rights are being limited by the coercive power of
government. This offends notions of fairness, reliance, and ownership.
Subdivision covenants. Developers who use the correct legal techniques can, and do, create large-scale covenant arrangements in subdivisions. They can su~jcct all lots to express covE'nants rehrulating, for
example, use of' the properties, types and styles of building, lot arrangement and setback, etc. Such covenants would expressly provide for a
mutual and reciprocal right of' enforcement by each lot against the oilwr.
This arrangement would bring the benefits to all lots of a residential
neighborhood, offsetting the loss of' value due to the restrictions on free
use of' the property. Indeed, many subdivision schemes actually increase
the value of the lots, since potential buyers value the restrictions
imposed on their neighbors more than they value the rc•ciprocal restrictions they accept themselves. Someone who has no intention of painting
his house purple, for example, would price a covenant not to do so close
to zero. That same person might be willing to pay quite a bit to ensure
that none of his neighbors could paint their houses purple. These
covenants would be placed in recorded instruments, providing notice of
the restrictions before purchasers bought their interests. Note the kl!Y
ingredients in this scenario that were missing in Sanborn-the express
covenant and the recorded document.
Implied covenants in Sanborn. Covenant enforcement can be justified, therefore, only when they arc created by consent. When there is no

*

211 Sep Korngold, supra not<' 17,
10.02 !describing raeial ,·ovpnants and ,·m,Pnants
barring group honws as violating puhlie policy I.
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express indicator of such consent (i.e., an express agreement, preferably
written) the inference is that no consensual arrangement was made.
Thus, when a court proceeds in the absence of express consent and seeks
to imply consent, it must proceed extremely carefully.
The decision of the Sanborn court to imply a reciprocal negative
easement is surprising in light of these concerns. It is also surprising in
light of the precedents on covenants available to the Sanborn court.
Courts deciding covenant cases, including those in Michigan, often
express a distrust of restrictions on land. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court of Michigan declared in 1905 that "Ii It is the general rule
that restrictions on property will be construed strictly against those
claiming to enforce them, and all doubts resolved in favor of the free use
of" the property. " 21 This statement has been repeated in numerous
Michigan cases before and after Sanhorn. 22 This statement teaches a
powerful lesson. Covenants can indeed bring benefits. At the same time,
they pose a risk of deterring sales and development if holdouts refuse to
consent to release of covenants in the future or if the transaction costs of
removing restrictions become excessive. Implying covenants poses an
even greater disincentive to land markets and development because
owners and potential buyers are now subject to vague, unpredictable,
and perhaps unascertainable agreements binding the property? 1 The
integrity of the record system is eroded by validating unrecorded interests.
The court opens the door to these problems in Sanborn, without
adequately considering the cost to the system and whether the benefits
to the other owners and society are worth the price. Remember that all
along, if the McLaughlins had desired to create residential covenants
binding all lots, they could have done so easily and inexpensively by
recording provisions in all of the deeds. Purchasers could have refused to
buy lots unless this scheme was expressly created.
Moreover, the cases cited by the Michigan Supreme Court in Sanborn do little to support the implication of a restriction against a
subsequent purchaser of a lot without an express covenant. Rather,
these cases deal with other issues. For example, Allen u. City of" Detroit2 1
involved an action against a subdivider who had orally expressly prom21

Janws v. Irvine, 141 Mich. :)76, 104 N.W. fi:ll, fi:J2-o:i:i (lfJ0G1.

22 SP<,. P.g., City of" Livonia v. Department of" Social S<·rvic,Js, 42:l Mich. 466, :l78
N.W.2d 402 I l\J8GI; Bos(.on-Edison l'roU•ctive Ass'n v. l'aulist l<'athers, :l06 Mich. 2!i:l, 10
N.W.2d 847 1194:)J; Casturt.on v. Plot.kin, 188 Mich. :l:l:l, l!i4 N.W. l!il I HllGJ.
2 :1 The <il·cision also allows the cn·ation of an inten,st. in real propt>r!.y ( i.l'., tlw
n,ciprocal ,wgative <,as<'m<•ntJ without a writing, thus contradicting the Statute of Frauds.

21 167 Mich. 464, 1:i:l N.W. :ll 7 I 19111. i"or a similar set of facts, again difforent from
Sanborn but. yet cited for support by the Supreme Court, Sl'<' McQuade v. Wilcox, 216 Mich.
:J02, 18:l N.W. 771 I 19211.
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ised to bind his retained land under residential restrictions similar to
those that he placed on the lots that he conveyed to the plaintiffa. The
plaintiffs, who were original grantees of the subdivider, sued when he
attempted to sell two retained lots without restrictions. Allen was a quite
different case than Sanborn, as there was evidence of an express promise
by the subdivider. It also did not involve enforcement against a remote
purchaser of an unrestricted lot, but was more in the nature or an
estoppel/consumer protection action against an overreaching developer
who had made an express promise to be bound by a covenant.
Even if one were to favor the Michigan Supreme Court's test, a fair
reading of the facts presented by the court do not show a clear general
plan by the McLaughlins that could he the basis of implying a reciprocal
negative easement. So much does not add up. For example, how could
there have been a general plan if only 53 of the 91 lots had restrictions
in their chains of title? This is merely 58</r of the properties, and this is
not a case where covenants were mistakenly omitted from a few lois.
One would think that the numbers alone counter the finding of' an intent
to create a general plan. The opinion cites no other evidence that might
support the finding of an intent to create a general plan, such as sales
brochures, advertisements, testimony of real estate agents, written and
oral statements of the McLaughlins, contracts of sale, etc. from the Lime
that the McLaughlins planned and began marketing the dt•velopment.~~,
The evidence of a general plan in the opinion is weak or nonexistent; in
fact, it is negated by that 58'/r number.~'; Given this dubious evidence or
intent and the law's favoring of free use of land, the court's finding of a
general plan~the lynchpin of the reciprocal negative easement argument~is curious and misguided.

Inquiry notice
The court took an unprecedented and wrong view of inquiry notice
to find that John McLean knew of the implied covenant when he
purchased the property. This is tNident from the court's own nmdition of
the facts as well as additional information from the record.
Notice the01y. One of the major advances of the American land
transactions system was the development of recording acts and title
operations early in our history.~' The recording acts serve various func'!.., Latl•1· <:ascs n•liPd on such evidPnl"l'. S,,,-, l'.g., W,•IJl•r v. L,·s l'l•till' i\ead,•111i,•s. Inc.,
G48 S.W.2d 847 !Mo. App. J!)7(il; l{iver Birch i\ssocs. v. City of' lfal,,igli, :l:W N.C. 100, :lS8
S.K2d G:l8 ilfl!lOI: Lehmann v. Wallac<', filO S.W.2d H7fi ITPx.Ci,·.App. ID711.
'!. 6 [roni<:ally. l'laintifT Sanborn's lot did not <'Vl'll havl' an ,•xpn•ss co,·,•nant l"l'l"<ll"<i<-d
against it. l{ccord, supra not,, 4, at. G7-G8, (i6-(i8.
'!.i On thl' n,cording acts and t.lw policil's, Sl'l' (;l'rald Korngold & l'aul (;oJdstpin. !{,·al
!•:stale Transactions: Cases and Mall-rials on Land Transf,•r, lk\'l·lopnwnt and Finam·,,
244-:l4G 14th Pd. 20021.
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tions. First, the recording system protects owners of property interests
by providing an opportunity to record, so giving the entire world record
notice of their rights and making them superior to those of others.
Second, it penalizes owners who fail to record, by allowing subsequent
purchasers to prevail over unrecorded interests-this creates a powerful
incentive for people to record. Moreover, the common law rule of "first
in time, first in right" that existed prior to the recording acts would
favor the prior interest holder even if the subsequent purchaser had no
knowledge of the prior interest, thus making potential purchasers reluctant to engage in exchanges. Under the recording acts, in contrast,
market transactions are encouraged since purchasers can invest with
confidence and potential deal makers can identify owners of potential
target properties and engage in negotiations with them. An active,
secure real estate market brings efficiency benefits to society.
These policies favoring the recording system, i.e., protecting those
that follow recording procedure and punishing thm,e that do not, are
tempered by the portions of the doctrines of actual and inquiry notice
based on fairness considerations. So, though A has not recorded, if B
actually knows or should know of A, it seems wrong to allow B to prevail
over A's prior property interest. Thus, the recording acts inject inquiry
and actual notice into the equation by typically requiring B to be a
"bona fide purchaser," "good faith purchaser," or "purchaser without
notice."
That is all well and good. But, the rule of inquiry notice should not
be expanded from protecting the legitimate interests of the first purchaser and used to surprise the subsequent purchaser. Inquiry notice c;hould
not be utilized as a means to deprive property rights from a later
purchaser who could not fairly know or suspect that there was a prior
interest. That is what happened, though, in Sanborn.

Inquiry notice in Sanborn. The Michigan Supreme Court in Sanborn
introduced a high standard of inquiry notice, far beyond the usual. First,
it required McLean to inspect and inquire about not only lot 86 (i.e., the
property that he was buying) but also the entire neighborhood-far
beyond the limits of usual inspection and inquiry. The court expanded
the burden on purchasers without ever explaining why it did so, even
though the McLaughlins were the bad actors for failing to record an
express covenant that would give fair notice to potential buyers and
would serve the goal of creating an accurate record system. The court got
that wrong. The standard rule is that one who is searching record title
only has to search the chain of title for the lot that he is buying, i.e., lot
86, not other lots owned by grantorzx_a limit intended to reduce the
zs See, e.g., Buffalo Academy of' Sacn·d Heart v. Boehm Bros., 267 N.Y. 242, HJ6 N.K
42 I 19:lf,J.
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burden of the search. To discover the basis for an implied reciprocal
negative easement, however, the Sanborn court was in effect requiring
McLean to do such a much greater search-he would have had to look at
the deeds for neighboring lots.
Next, according to the court, McLean's observation of houses on
other lots plus knowledge from the abstract that there had been a
common subdivider of the area should have led him to conclude that
there was an implied covenant burdening his lot 86 even though nothing
was recorded against his property. This would been a tough task,
requiring the application of s<.:ant fads to an arrnne legal principle, even
if the dodrine of implied reciprocal restrictions had been well known.
But this would have been an espe<.:ially difficult feat in 1910 or 1911
when Md,ean wm; rnntemplating his <.:ontrnd to purchase since the
Sanborn v. McLean is arguably the first case to have declan!d the theory
of restrictions based on implied reciprocal negative easements!~!,
Moreover, even assuming that McLean had been able to forecast the
Michigan court's future adoption of the concept of' implied reciprocal
negative easements, guessed that the court now expanded the requirement of the buyer's inspection to include the entire neighborhood, and
that this inspection should had led him to speculate if there were an
implied mvenant burdening his lot, what would he have actually
learned? ff McLean had searched some of the titles of' neighboring lots at
random to see if there were a pattern of restrictions evidencing a general
plan, he might have found no express restrictions at all in the deeds he
looked at-remember only 53 of 91 had express restrictions in their
<.:hains of title! There would thus have been no hint to him of the
restrictive sc;heme. Indeed, the reasonable inf'erence from checking a
random selection of' other lots in the subdivision would be that some had
restrictions but others did not. Given all of this, the finding of inquiry
notice was incorrect. McLean unfairly lost property rights to a claim that
there is no way that he could have known about.
Other facts not cited by the court support the view that Mc;Lean
could not have fairly known about the restrictions. Plaintiff Sanborn
himself testified that there were other gasoline stations a bloc;k or so
away from ihe subdivision/' raising questions about what should have or
have not seemed evident to McLean about the presence of an implied
covenant when he bought. Moreover, the record lac;ks testimony about
the state of' the subdivision at the time McLean signed his rnntrad of'
:!!I The cas{' n•cL•iv('d noticP f'ron1 con1llH'lltaton; at lhl' tin1l'. ~{'(', P.g., Charil•~ E. Clark,
Assignahility of' 1•:asPnwn!s, Profits and l~quit.ablc• lfost rictions, :!8 Yale• L .. J. I :rn I 192819281; l{c,cpnt Casl's, 10 Minn. L. l{Pv. (il9 I IH2Gi; Sanborn v. McLC'an, \) Bi-Monthly L.
Rc•v. I U. Dd. I :n I 192G- I 92fi I.
:Ill

Record, supra note 4, at 71.
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sale. The court should have focused on that moment to determine what
McLean could have and should have understood about the neighborhood-that is the time that inquiry is required. Subsequent changes in
the area and the condition at the date of litigation are not relevant. The
trial court should have found that the plaintiffs failed to meet their
burden of proving that McLean did not adequately inspect at the time of
purchase.
How prevalent were subdivision covenants at that time? Would a
typical lot buyer expect that lots would generally be burdened by a
covenant? If lots were usually sold only with covenants, then it would be
an easier leap for the court to find that McLean should have inferred
that the neighborhood was subject to restrictions, thus making the
inquiry notice argument stronger. A review of classified advertisements
in contemporary newspapers reveals no common or prevalent practice of
advertising the presence of covenants in the sale of vacant lots. For
example, the classified section of the Detroit News of Sunday, January
16, 1910 (around the time that McLean purchased his lot) had 35 ads
under "For Sale-Vacant Lots," with many of the ads listing multiple
properties. This section of the classifieds contained ads for individual
lots, such as lot 86. Of the !35 ads (which ranged in size from 2 lines to 20
lines, with most being 6 to 10 lines), none said that the lots were under
restriction, three lots specifically noted that they were not restricted, and
the rest of the ads were silent on the issue.: 11 Thus, the ads did not signal
to consumers about covenants or restrictions, making it less likely that
restrictions would be in a buyer's consciousness.
While one has to be careful to draw too many inferences from such
thin evidence, it seems unlikely that the average buyer of a lot in an
existing subdivision (such as McLean) would have had covenants on his
mind; so, a buyer would be less likely to be on inquiry notice of implied
covenants in an area. Covenants do get mentioned in large ads for new,
large-scale subdivisions being mass-marketed by a subdivider,::~ hut these
ads appear only occasionally in the classifieds. Note that such advertisements are not for the type of lot purchased by McLean in 1910, i.e., a
single lot being sold by a subsequent purchaser, rather than the original
developers, in a subdivision where all the lots had already been sold by
the original developers_:i:i
:n Tlw Dd.roit Npws, Classif"1c•d SPc., l/1(1/1910, p.

D.

::~ For l'Xamph·, the ad for North Woodward Lois in Tlw Detroit News, Classifil'd
Section, Sunday, 6/:,/1910, p. IO or !he orn• for Marshland Bou!Pvanl Subdivision in Tlw
])ptroit NPws, Classifil'd Spdion, Sunday 6/12/1910, p. (i.
:i:: Tlw vast majority of Uw lots wne initially sold before I 900 and a handful
i11itially sold i11 1901-1\HJ7, l,pforc' McLPan pun:hased his lot. l{ecord, at 18-2:l.
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In light of these facts and circumstances, McLean's inspection and
inquiry as a potential buyer seemed more than adequate under the law
as it existed prior to Sanborn. His uncontrnverted testimony indicated
that he examined the abstract of title for lot 86 before buying and saw no
restriction on the title' 11 and that his seller assured him that the lot was
not restricted_:~, Even the Supreme Court of" Michigan stated in its
opinion that "we do not say Mr. McLean should have asked his neighbors about rcstrictions.":H; The finding of inquiry noticl! is illogical and
bad law.

The Real Story of Sanborn v. McLean?
The story that the Michigan Supreme Court told in its opinion does
not add up. Facts and policy do not support the stretching of the court to
imply a covenant and to find inquiry notice binding the McLeans. So
what was really going on?

Not Consumer Protection
I do not think that Sanborn is a consumer-protection narrative-i.e.,
where the court protects the expectations of the rnnsumer buyers in the
subdivision and delivers to them the residential scheme that they bargained and paid for but the developer (due to malfeasance or misfeasance) failed to deliver. It does not appear to be that story for various
reasons. First, 1925 is well before the advent of the era of significant
pro-consumer decisions. Caveat emptor, privity n,les, and non-intervention in markets were the ethos. If a court was going to innovatl! in
consumer protection law, this would be an unlikely place to start.
Moreover, the factual record and the subdivision homeowners do not
make for a particularly strong consumer protection case for the plaintiffs. The record shows a lack of due diligence, even a lack of a minimum
of care, by the homeowners to determine (before they bought) whether
the subdivision was under a general plan of restrictions. Owners testified
that when they purchased their lots they were "told,"' 17 "advised,"'1~ or
"understood"' 111 that the neighborhood was under restriction. This information came from their sellers (not the McLaughlins but subsequent
owners) or was based on the witnesses' general impressions of the
:ii

lkconl, suprn 11o(l' 4 at 117, lfiO.

::., Id. at. l:iO.
:H;

20fi N.W.2d at. 498.

::, Rl'cord, supra 110!.l' 4. at (i6 ISanlior11·s (estirno11yl.
::s Id. at. 9:l 1Fred(•rick W. Minton·, testinl<lnyl.
:1! 1 Jd.

a( 108 ((;porgl' S. Fil'ld"s (.(•st.irnonyl.
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neighborhood. None of these nine witnesses 111 consulted a lawyer or other
professional for an opinion at to the existence of the neighborhood
scheme. Moreover, three of the nine witnesses who testified that they
thought that the whole neighborhood was restricted admitted that they
had no express restrictions in their titles. 11 The testimony reveals a
passive group of buyers, who accepted casual, vague statements about
the area's "common reputation" 12 without following up or inquiry.
Consider the example of' George S. Field's testimony for plaintiffs:
Q I direct examination I: Did you make any inquiry or receive any
information at the time you bought, as to whether property on
Collinwood avenue was restricted for residential purposes?

A:

I understood it was for residential purposes.

* *

Q /cross examination/: You find in your abstract absolutely no
restrictions on your lot and never had been since it was platted?
A: I took it on representation of the neighborhood. It was platted
and used for residential purposes only. "1
You may be surprised to learn that Field, who based on his testimony
apparently followed a "no diligence" approach, was a lawyer! In light of
this passivity, the owners' reliance on a supposed scheme of' restrictions
seems unwarranted or suspect, making them less than ideal consumerprotection plaintiffs in 1925.
Had these owners been more assertive, they could have forced the
issue earlier, prevented the situation with McLean from arising, and
helped to improve the record system. Thus, when the initial lot buyers
from the McLaughlins purchased their properties they could have asked
to see a legally binding instrument creating the restrictive scheme in the
neighborhood and requested that it be recorded as a condition of their
purchase. That would have made the covenants express against all of the
lots and a matter of record for all potential purchasers. Even subsequent
buyers from original purchasers should have required recorded documentation of the supposed restriction, which would have avoided the problem
and made the recording system better. Instead, they chose to ignore the
problem~which ultimately landed in the McLeans' lap.
11 ' Sanborn, Minton, Elmer W. Voorheis, Fn•derick i\. Mat.thews, Field, Arthur TuUl!•,
Francis(;_ Harv,•y, George W. Hurd, Edmund D. ,Jackson, Id. at 6(i-140.

11

Id. at G7-/i8 1SanhornJ, % !Minton I, 108 WiPld1.

12

Id. at. 9:l I Minton).

1: 1 1d.at

108,109.
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When courts innovate by creating new rights and duties, they
usually do so in cases with sympathetic plaintiffs whose circumstances
help make the case for the legal innovation. But of the three groups of
actors in this story-the McLaughlins, the subdivision owners, and the
McLeans-placing liability on the McLeans makes the least sense in
terms of moral blameworthiness and efficiency considerations. I have
discussed the roles of the owners and the McLeans. As to the McLaughlins, the record is unclear why they acted the way that they did and
created an ambiguous common scheme development. On one hand, they
may have been playing it both ways-including residential restrictions in
deeds where that would pk!ase a residential buyer but omitting restrictions in deeds where a potential commercial user might come along and
seek an unrestricted lot (at a premium price). They may have been
unsure if the project would sell as a residential development, so they may
have been trying to keep flexibility by being vague and inconsistent
about the restrictive scheme. On the other hand, these were the early
days of residential subdivisions and the state of the art was not well
developed. 11 In later times a more sophisticated practice would develop
where the subdivider would record a declaration of restrictions against
the entire subdivision before any conveyances are made and create a
binding scheme-hut that may not have yet been a common practice. 1" It
does not appear from the record that the McLaughlins had legal counsel
in the conveyancing and so perhaps the McLaughlins were just careless
in preparing the deeds. They, like many developers, may have run into
financial problems and had to sell lots at any terms in order to keep
afloat. Much is unknown.
What we do know is that Sanborn u. McLean does not look like a
consumer protection story. This was not a pro-consumer era and these
consumers are not great plaintiffs. Two other narratives may be the true
story of" Sanborn.

Zoning by Judicial Fiat
By the late 19th century, Detroit had become a mqjor industrial city.
The discovery of iron ore in the upper peninsula of Michigan, good canal
connections to Detroit, and extensive public utilities were key factors in
the city's emergence as a center for heavy industry. 11; It produced and
wholesaled goods for the national and international markets. 1' Auto
11 For a history of' large-scale subdivision, seP Marl' /\. W<'iss, TIH' l{is,, of' t.lw
Co1111nu11ity Builders I I/J/-171.

i:, :-,,,,, Korngold, supra not,, 17,
11 ;Art.hur

* 9.0:l.

M. Woodf',ml, This is lldrnit: 1701 :WO! 7:i-77. H:i-/-16 1Wayn,, Stat,, Univ.

Pn,ss 200 I I.
17 Sid,w_v (;laz,,r. Detroit: A St.ucly in llrhan lkv,•lopnwnt :iO IBook,nan Assol'iatt>s,
Nc•w York, 19(i:il.
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manufacturing was a huge engine driving the local economy, beginning
in the 1890s and growing into the early decades of the 20th century. For
example, employment in auto manufacturing in Detroit rose from 7,200
workers in 1908 to 120,000 in 1916. 1s
During the early twentieth century, the population of Detroit was
migrating away from the central core of the city to newly developed
portions of the city, "out Woodward"-to the area in which Green Lawn
Subdivision was located. 111 Various factors contributed to this. First, the
population of the Detroit metro area boomed during that time, and more
housing was needed. The area had 340,843 people in 1900, 524,615 in
1910, 1,186,282 in 1920, and 1,974,471 in 1930-a 479cy, increase in 30
years?' Newcomers were both native-born and immigrants, drawn by
economic opportunities.:, 1
Additionally, special factors in Detroit drew population away from
the central city. The Detroit metro area had higher automobile use than
other cities, leading to an outward movement of population.'' 2 Henry
Ford built his automobile plants outside the prior metro area, pulling
people along with them.:.:i Neighborhoods thus developed outside of the
central core.
As in other American cities, workers sought residential settings as a
refuge from the noise, pollution, and activity of commercial and industrial life. It was in these areas that citizens sought to raise their families
and find peace and self-fulfillment.:, 1 Although today there are competing
views as to the benefit of isolating residential from other activities/:,
1K

Clazer, supra note 4G, at 7fi.

111 Glazer, supra note 4fi, al 76; see Woodford, supra no!.P 4fi, at 88; HPatlwr B. Barrow,
The American Disc,asc, of Growth: Henry Ford and tlw Metropolitization of Detroit., 19201940, in Robert. Lewis (ed.i, Manufacturing Suburbs: Building Work and Horne on the
Metropolitan Fringe 200-220, at 211 !Temple Univ. Press 2004).
·• 11 Michigan Planning Commission, A Study of Subdivision in the Detroit. Metropolitan
Area (Lansing, MI 19:lGJ.

:,i

Woodford, supra note 4fi, at Sfi-86.

·• 2 .June Manning Thomas, Redevelopment and Race: Planning a Finer City in Postwar
Detroit 14 !The ,Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1997).

:,:i

Barrow, supra nok 48, at 201.

:,1 See Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Intergenerational Conflicts of Real Property
Law: Preserving Free Markets and Personal Autonomy for Future Generations, fi(i Amer.
U.L. Rl,v. lfi2fi, lfi:l6-lfi:l7 (2007); see generally John Stilgoe, Borderland: Origins of the
American Suburb, 1820-19:39 I 19881.

:,:, See Andres Duany, Elizabl'th Plater-Zyherk & Jeff Speck, Suburban Nation: The
Hise of Sprawl and the Decline of the American Dream llfi-133 (paperback ed. 2001 i
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throughout much of the 20th century this represented consumer preferences and was considered socially beneficial.
The rapid expansion of Detroit, however, was not easy. The growth
was largely unregulated. Although discussions about instituting zoning
began in Detroit soon after New York City passed its zoning ordinance in
1916/'1; Detroit did not enact a zoning ordinance until 1940." 7 Thus the
city had no real tools with which to plan, control, and manage land use
and growth. The city's rapid unplanned expansion concerned many of
Detroit's leading citizens. Harvey Whipple, the chief executive of thli
American Concrete Institute, in 1919 called for the passage of a Detroit
zoning ordinance to address unregulated growth:
Detroit's growth has been like Topsy's; it has been without plan; it
has happened,· it has occurred as the immediate occasion dictated
and individual development has alwayH been paramount to the
public good.
There has been no scheme by which investors could
be reaHonably sure of the values of their property.''s
Some thought the private sectors' market's response insufficient to
deal with the rapid industrialization and expansion?' A 19;35 study by
the Michigan Planning Commission described excessive subdividing that
left surplus subdivided land, tax delinquencies, and problems with local
government finance. 1;11 The study noted that "lal fr!w well planned
subdivisions arc to be found, but on the whole the platted lands arc cut
up into lots designed for the immediate advantage of speculative operators, and are not patterned for the best ultin1dte use." 1; 1 The study
lcriticizi11g sprawling n•sic!t-ntial an•asl: l{obPr( llruegc•niann, Sprawl: /\ Compact I listory
l~00G I I l'avoring c'xpansion ol' n•sidPn( ial an·asJ.
:,,; Scl' Edward M. Bassdt. Sprl'ading ol' Zoning Law: Cit ic•s All ( )wr ( :ount 1·y l<'ollow
Exam pl,, or N<'w York, 'I'IH' Nc•w York Time's, 11411 !l20, p. S 1~: ,Jan Krnsnowi,,cki, i\holish
Zoning, ;n Syr. L. l{,,v. 71 fl, 72:)-724 I Hl801.
;->7

lit tp://www .detroit1ni,gov/Legi~-dat ivl'/ Boards( '.om 1nissi<>ns i( '.ity J>lan ning{ \1111,nissi(lll

1

plan11i11g_mission.ht.rn I last visited 7;1;'()81.
:;,, Harvey Whippll', City !'Ian Commission lkgins Its (;rm( Task of llringing Ord,•r
Out of Detroit's Chaos, Dl'Lroit Saturday Nig·hl, :l/ri/1919, p. ~. quot.Pd in Barrnw, suprn
no(l' 48, at 218-219. S,,,, also Daniel M. lllul's(o1H', DPt.roit"s City lkaut.iful and tlw
l'rohlcm or Conrnwrc<', -17 ,Journal or tlw Society of Architl'durnl Historians 2,1G 119881.
For background on l Iarv<'.Y WhipplP, SC'<' http: /www.com-rl'tC'.org,g<'1wral:Al listoryoL\CI.
pdr., last visit.Pd (kt.ol)('r 16, 2008.
··•! 1 For a discussion or thl' dawn of th<' zoning <'ra. S<'P t.lw chapL<•r hy David Callic•s in
this volume,, Village' ol' Euclid v. AmhlPr l{<'alty Co.; William T. llogart., .. Trading l'lac·"s"":
Tlw !fol,, of' Zoning in l'rnmot.ing and Discouraging· Int.ranH't.rnpolit.an Trad,,, [i 1 Cas,, W.
!{l's. L. l{l'v. 697 12001 I

,;o Study, supra notl' ·19, at 1.
,;i

Id. at 2.
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maintained that "low quality residence sections, many of which may be
characterized as rural slums, have sprung up over the entire area, and
these not only give rise to difficult relief, education, and health problems,
but also have a strangulating effect upon the development of higher
grade residential areas. " 1;~

It is in this setting that Judge Driscoll tried the case of Sanborn u.
McLean. And here entered the key actor, in my view, of the Sanborn u.
McLean story~T. Glenn Phillips. Phillips gave a bravura performance at
the trial, shaped the story of the case, and sold it to Judge Driscoll.
Phillips' version is the story that the trial court adopted and the
Michigan Supreme Court ratified.
Phillips was called as a witness by the plaintiffs. His testimony
indicated that he was an architect and city planner and had previously
served for nine years as a commissioner on the Detroit City Planning
Commission_i;:i Since 1919 and continuing at the time of the trial, Phillips
was a consultant with the Commission. Phillips had done work with
other communities on city planning issues, including zoning questions.
He testified that he had familiarity with the nature and use of properties
in the Green Lawn Subdivision area.'; 1 While not discussed in the record,
Phillips was an author of articles and reports on traffic problems and
solutions in Detroiti;" and city tree planting_i;i; Subsequent to the decision
in Sanborn, he consulted to Grosse Pointe Village, Grosse Pointe Farms,
and Gross Pointe Park, Michigan to advise in the preparation of those
villages' zoning ordinances.'; 7 He was also a successful practitioner of
landscape architecture_l;H
In my view, however, Phillips' testimony had nothing to do with the
key is::mes of the case. He first testified on direct that allowing a gas
station would be "detrimental to the community" 1;!, as it would intrude
i;~

lei. at :l.

i;:i Ifocord,
i;i

supra note 4, at 76.

Id. at 77.

i;s T. Glenn Phillips, The Automohik: Its l'rovincl' and Its Problems, 11 ti Annals of the
Anwr. Academy of' Political and Social Sci. 241 119241.
lili 'I'. Gll•nn Phillips, City Tree Planting, Detroit City Plan Commission, lfoport No. I,
R,•v. like. Hll41.

i; 7

(;rosse Pointe Civic News, vol.4, no.:l, SPpt., 192/i, at 2; Gross Pointe Civic NPws, vol.

:i., No. 10, April, 1928, at :l.
i;s

S,•e, l'.g., photo of' Henry and Clara Ford homL', http://cll'troit1701.org/Forc!Home.

htm.
i;!J

]{peon!, supra note 4, at 77, 78, 79, 80.
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into "a highly developed residential section."'" This might be sound
advice to a subdivider and part of a recommendation to include express
reciprocal residential covenants in a subdivision, but it does not address
the issue of the case: i.e., whether McLean's lot was subject to a
covenant. Moreover, Phillips' general testimony that there should be no
commercial uses in residential districts shed no light on the nuisance
issue, since nuisance law is all about balancing competing uses in the
same neighborhood.
Phillips, though, did more-he advocated for the techniques USl'd hy
public zoning and extolled the virtues of this model. Phillips' testimony
supported the typical zoning practice of his timc-i.e., the division of' the
city into separate zones, each with specified uses. This segregation of
residential, commercial, and manufacturing activitit!S was a key as1wct of
early zoning. 71 He testified that the Green Lawn area "is a highly
developed residential section of the city and should be specialized as such
and any intrusion allowed to come in there would break down that
residential character." 72 As a planner, he thought he knew what the city
needed and how land should be allocated for particular uses: "We have
enough business, commercial use in the City of Detroit f'or f'our and onehalf million people.''
Phillips not only advocated a vision consistent with zoning concepts,
but also in his testimony he directly favored the passage of a zoning
ordinance in Detroit. He painted an attractive picture of Detroit if' such a
governmental zoning scheme came into l!xistcnce:
[T[he proposed zoning ordinance which places the city
and allows the city to grow in orderly manner, with
certain sections and residences in others, specialize tlw
munity, and allows it to grow, because as a city grows
great many specialized districts .... 71

in districts
husiness in
whole comthere an• a

And Phillips had the self-confidence, or was it the aJToganCl\ to sell
his dreams. He believed that planners and zoning officials, rather than
markets, could best set the value and success of properties. Consider this
exchange during cross examination:

Q:

Out on Second avenue there are a number of' gas stations?

711 Id. at 7H.
71 SPP, t•.g·.. Villag,, of' Euclid v. /\1nblPr l{!'alty Co., '27'2 li.S. :Hiii I !()'2(i1. Traditio11al
"Euclid,·a11" zo11i11g co11LL 111plat.,·d sl'para1'• zorn•s. In contrast, ,·111Tt•11t planning t ill'ory
0

fi.1vors 1nix<.'d-L1S{', to e11t·ouragt• lll'ighhorhond shopping and <.'Ollllllt1nity t·olH·sion. St•<.•

Duany ,,t al., supra notp ii4.
'" l{l'cord, supra not,· 4, a! 79.
7'1 Id.

at HO.
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A:

Yes, sir; shouldn't be there.

Q:
A:

But they arc there now?
Yes, sir.

Q:

It is your opinion that they shouldn't be there?

No, basing it on statistics, facts what other people-71
His expert opinion, not people's preferences expressed through market
choices, were what mattered to him.
Moreover, in Phillips' mind, zoning was inevitable, it was the future,
it was coming to Detroit, and so it was time to get on board:
A:

(~: Icross examination I: You don't propose to tell this court you can
tell the court certain districts in this City of Detroit that are going
to be good districts and those that arc not?
A: Never can tell but there is going to be a plan very soon which
will allow a certain district to be allowed for residential, others for
manufacture, and so on.
Q: You are not familiar enough at the present time to tell this
court or anyone else, what certain districts in Detroit are going to be
business districts and what not in the next ten or twenty years?
A: Yes, I think we are. 7:;
Judge Driscoll certainly seemed to be a believer in the planning
gospel Phillips preached. He wanted to hear Phillips' story. Defense
counsel made five lengthy, and correct in my view, objections during
Phillips' direct testimony claiming that the testimony was not material
or relevant to the legal issues before the court?; Counsel also objected to
the latitude that the court gave Phillips to spin out his story in
"narrative form." 77 Counsel was again right on this issue-Phillips'
testimony reads like a professor lecturing on the virtues of zoning and
planning. But Judge Driscoll wanted to hear Phillips tell his tale and
ruled against the defense each time it objected.
Phillips' vision may have been a good one, and may have seemed
especially appealing in 1920s Detroit. But it had nothing to do with the
case of Sanborn u. McLean. The issue in the case was whether the
parties, by consent and using private law, had created restrictions on
McLean's property. Phillips instead told a story of the supposed benefits
of public regulation of land, through the imposition of zoning by government on a non-consenting individual. One can only speculate, but
71

Id. at 83.

7:;

Id. at 82.

71i

Id. al 77, 78, 7H, 80.

77

Id. at 77; se,• abo at 80.
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Phillips' utopian picture of a future with uses of land segregated and
controlled could well have motivated the court to imply a covenant on
the defendant's land, despite the legal and policy weaknesses of such a
decision. Did Phillips thus encourage Judge Driscoll to engage in improper "judicial zoning?"
Even if one agrees with the notion that the public should regulate
land, this should be the province of the legislature not the courts. Judge
Driscoll should not have been imposing non-consensual land regulation
on individual owners as the agent of government. Under our Constitutional system, such decisions are left to democratically-elected and accountable legislatures, who can best represent Uw will of the people on
how our precious land resources should he utilized and regulated. Public
rq,11.dation of land involves hard choices, evolving conditions, needs, and
techniques, and accounting for different world views. Regulatory decisions balancing these competing interests should not be arrogated to
futurist judges or unelected expert bureaucrats such as Phillips.
So, one alternative story of Sanborn u. McLean may be that of a
compelling proponent of public zoning convincing the court that regulating land and :-;egregating residential uses was es:-:ential for social and
economic success, with the court then misapplying that lesson to a
private dispute over a consensual restrictive covenant. This narrative
would explain the bizarre result at the trial and appellate levels.

Professional Courtesy
There is another likely story in Sanborn u. McLean~profcssional
courtesy or what we might perhaps better Lenn sycophancy. Arthur J.
Tuttle, Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan was one of the other homeowncrn on Collingwood Avenue.
He testified as a witness for the plaintiffs, stating that he occupied the
house with his family and de.sired to "live and die" there.'' He bought a
vacant lot there since it was a "high-grade neighborhood."•!' He said that
a gasoline station would decrease his property's valm' and that he would
have not purchased his lot if he had not thought that it was a residential-only neighborhood." 11
This was a powerful witness for the plaintiffa~a sitting federal
judge with twelve years on the bench appearing in a state court proceeding, defending his home." 1 Even better, both Judge Tuttle"" and Judge
•·'Id.at l!H-119.
7!1 Id.
" 11

at I 19.

Id.at 119-120.

" 1 ,Judg,·
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Driscoll 8' 1 were Republicans. Judge Tuttle was active in electoral politics,
even running unsuccessfully in 1924 for the U.S. Senate nomination
while still on the bench. 81 So, did Judge Driscoll, holding an elective
office, stretch to accommodate the wishes of this impressive and important fellow party member? Perhaps the McLeans were up against forces
far greater than the legal issues at hand. We cannot know, but this may
be another story that explains the Sanborn u. McLean result.

The Final Story

In Sanborn u. McLean, the Supreme Court of Michigan took an
overly expansive view of implied covenants and inquiry notice. This
version has been binding precedent in Michigan and influential on courts
in other jurisdictions. But the story that the court told is troubling for
legal and policy reasons. I have suggested that there may have been
other narratives-zoning by judicial fiat and professional courtesy-that
may better explain how the court reached its decision. This may be of
some comfort to those struggling to understand the illogical story that
the court told, but is less solace to those who must live with the reality of
the court's strange holdings. 8:;
.~:i http://politicalgrnveyard.com/bio/driseoll.ht111l#OPlJO(~,JDJA (last

visited July l 5,

2008).
81 http://www.ea6. uscou rts.gov/1 ib_hist/cou rts/district'lr 20eou rt/M 1/EDM 1/judges/ajt-bio.
html Ilast visited July I 7, 2008!.

x:; If you want to sL,e the McLean lot today, look at Google satellite. http://maps.googlt-.
com/maps?sourceid = navclient&aq =Collingwood'!t 20Avcnue&ie= UTF-8&rlz = I T4(WRC_
enUS218US218&q=Collingwood f Avenue&oe= UTF-8&um= l&sa=N&tab=wl, last visited October 17, 2008. Note the single residential building on the lot Ion the northeast
corner of the intersection of Cc,llingwood and Second), as well as the house, and vaeant lots
currently on Collingwood.

